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THE NEW PARADOX OF THE STONE
Alfred R. Mele and M. P. Smith
The traditional paradox of the stone may be interpreted as posing a competition between a
pair of omnipotent beings, represented by God at two different times. The new paradox
poses a question about simultaneous competition between a pair of omnipotent beings. We
make use of an attractive Thomistic response to the former paradox in arguing that the
latter situation is logically possible.

Fred, an omnipotent being, wishes to have an omnipotent companion. So he creates Barney. Having created Barney, however, Fred begins to doubt that either of
them is omnipotent.
Fred finds it troublesome that neither he nor Barney can create a stone too heavy
for the other to lift, throw a baseball too fast for the other to hit, or too far for the
other to catch, and so on. On the other hand, Fred feels as strong as ever. How
could the appearance of a new face on the scene lessen his own intrinsic abilities?
He can't ask Barney ifhe feels the same as before, of course; but if Barney were not
omnipotent, wouldn't that impugn Fred's omnipotence as well? He had tried to
create another omnipotent being, after all, and when one tries to do something and
fails, one can't very well call oneself omnipotent.
There is a way out for Fred, propounded by Thomas Aquinas. I Even omnipotent
beings, he said, cannot accomplish the logically impossible. Fred's failure to create a peer need not count against his omnipotence, provided that the task is an
impossible one.
Some have thought the task to be impossible, on the grounds that the coexistence
of two omnipotent beings is impossible. If there were two omnipotent beings, then,
in cases of disagreement, at least one would find itself thwarted. But an omnipotent
being cannot be thwarted. Hence there cannot be two omnipotent beings.2
This line of reasoning ignores the implications of the thesis it seeks to employ.
That Fred cannot make a stone too heavy for Barney to lift, or throw a ball too
fast for Barney to hit, does not count against his omnipotence, provided that
Barney is omnipotent too. An omnipotent being can lift any stone, no matter
how heavy, or hit any pitch, no matter how fast. Since it is impossible for there
to be a stone too heavy for an omnipotent being to lift, or a ball too fast for him
to hit, it does not count against Fred's omnipotence that he cannot make a stone
heavy enough, or throw a ball hard enough, to thwart such a being. 3
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It might be objected that we have unduly restricted the means available to
omnipotent beings in their attempts to create immovable or unstoppable stones.
Fred is not limited to creating stones of different weights, or throwing them at
different speeds. There may be any number of ways in which a stone could be
immovable or unstoppable; it might be extremely slippery, for example.
We need take no position, however, on whether someone suitably clever could
make a stone unliftable or unstoppable even by an omnipotent being. For these
deeds of lifting and stopping are either possible or they are impossible. If they
are impossible, then the inability of an entity to perform them does not impugn
its omnipotence. If they are possible tasks, on the other hand, the inability of
another being to prohibit an omnipotent being from accomplishing them does
not count against its omnipotence either. Thwarting an omnipotent being's execution of a possible task is not possible, and hence cannot be expected even of the
omnipotent.'
Thus the Thomistic solution to the original paradox of the stone seems to
allow a multiplicity of omnipotent beings. In fact, the question, "Can God create
a stone that he cannot lift?", poses a competition between a pair of omnipotent
beings, represented by God at different times. If the fact that God cannot now
create a stone that he will be unable to lift later does not count against his
omnipotence, then the fact that Fred cannot create a stone that Barney would be
unable to lift should not count against Fred's omnipotence.
So far our omnipotent duo has been alternating, each taking a tum at attempting
to outdo the other. This pattern is the result of the way that the stone paradox
is usually stated, involving as it does different temporal stages of the same being.
In the traditional stone paradox, each omnipotent being, represented by a temporal
stage of God, gets exactly one tum .. The omnipotent being to make the last
move, the later temporal stage, always wins. Once understood, the outcome of
the stone paradox is no harder to predict than that of a (finitely long) game of
one-upmanship between Fred and Barney-say a friendly slam-dunk contest in
basketball. The situation is more confusing, however, if we allow competitions
without a sequence of turns.
Suppose that Fred attempts to lift a given stone and that Barney simultaneously
attempts to keep the stone where it is. If we accept that any stone can be either
moved or kept still, and accept also that an omnipotent being can move or keep
still whatever can be moved or kept still, then it appears that the stone must
both move and not move at the same time. Since an omnipotent being's endeavor
to perform a possible task cannot be thwarted, Barney cannot block Fred's
attempt to move the stone, nor can Fred thwart Barney's attempt to keep the
stone stationary. So the stone must move and it must not move.
Alternatively, we might decide along Thomistic lines that 'moving a stone
that an omnipotent being wishes to hold in place,' and 'holding in place a stone
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that an omnipotent being wishes to move,' do not describe logically possible
tasks, so that even omnipotent beings cannot perform them. Would the stone
then neither move nor not move? The Thomistic account may be capable of
preserving the omnipotence of both Fred and Barney. But what happens to the
stone?5
One suggestion is that, as a consequence of the struggle, the stone might go
out of existence. If the disputed stone ceases to exist, then it will not have moved
(if this implies having a different location afterwards), nor will it have remained
stationary (if this implies having the same location afterwards). Thus, there is
something that can happen to the stone.
Other contests would not be resolved by this trick, however. Suppose that
Fred undertakes to destroy a given stone that Barney wishes to preserve. Here,
the intended tasks aim, not at contrary states of affairs, but at contradictory
states. Does this contest have a possible outcome?6
We shall argue shortly that it does. Let us return first, however, to the main
bout over the motion/rest of the stone. We suggest that the stone can move
provided that Fred doesn't move it, and that it can remain unmoved so long as
Barney doesn't stop it from moving. More precisely, the stone can move provided
that nothing moves it, and it can remain at rest provided that nothing keeps it
from moving. That is, what is impossible in the scenario at issue are certain
types of action, not the states of affairs which those actions would produce.
Nothing can move a stone that an omnipotent being wills to hold still, and
nothing can hold a stone that an omnipotent being wills to move. So in the
omnipotent face-off, both types of action-moving the contested stone and
holding it in place-are impossible. But the stone's moving and the stone's
remaining still are, nevertheless, possible states of affairs. In a world in which
there are uncaused events, the contested stone may either move or not move,
even though it is impossible for anything to move it or to hold it in placeincluding omnipotent beings like Fred and Barney. Paradoxically, the omnipotence of each can be preserved provided that both are thwarted.
On our suggested solution to the new? stone paradox, neither Fred nor Barney
will prevail. Nevertheless, their omnipotence is not impugned, since on the
Thomistic line even omnipotent beings cannot do the impossible. Nor are we
committed to the absurdity that the stone (assuming that it does not cease to
exist) can neither move nor not move, since either may happen provided that its
happening is uncaused. Even head-to-head competition between omnipotent
beings over incompatible states of affairs is possible in a world in which events
may be uncaused. And this is true even when the states are contradictories and
not merely contraries. In the destruction/preservation case, e.g., the stone may
either continue to exist or cease to exist, provided that the outcome is uncaused.
Of course, we still have no way of telling what will happen to the contested

286

Faith and Philosophy

stones in such cases, but at least we know that it is possible for something to
happen to them. When the intended tasks aim at contradictory states of affairs,
the outcome, we can confidently say, will be uncaused. Its being uncaused is
the result of simultaneous competition between omnipotent beings. When the
contest is over contrary states of affairs, there will be some distinct caused or
uncaused resolution.
Suppose that Barney tries to keep a particular stone in place, that Fred attempts
to move it,and that, as it happens, the stone moves. We have argued that the
omnipotence of both can be preserved if the stone's motion (or, in another case,
its lack of motion) is uncaused. But one might think that Fred does cause the
stone to move in the case under consideration. After all, if he had not intervened,
the stone would not have moved; for there would have been nothing to prevent
Barney from keeping the stone in place. Thus, one might contend, Fred is
causally responsible for the stone's moving, and therefore the stone's moving
is not uncaused.
The confusion here is not difficult to locate. One must distinguish between
causing the stone to move and causing a condition under which it is possible for
the stone to move. On our suggestion, Fred renders impossible Barney's keeping
the stone stationary. Similarly, Barney makes it impossible for Fred to move
the stone. 8 Jointly, they create a situation in which the stone's behavior may be
uncaused. Rather than causing the stone to move, Fred's activity (in conjunction
with Barney's) makes it possible for the stone to undergo uncaused motion (or
uncaused non-motion).
One who grants that the stone's movement has no direct or proximate cause
might wish to contend that Fred's behavior is an indirect cause of the stone's
moving; for his activity helps to generate the first-order stalemate condition under
which the stone moved. But this is mistaken. An indirect cause of an event, E,
contributes to the causation of E by causing something else that contributes,
either directly or indirectly, to the causation of E. Ultimately, any indirect cause
of E is linked to E by a proximate cause. However, the stone's movement, ex
hypothesi, has no proximate cause. Fred's behavior cannot be an indirect cause
of the stone's moving, since there is no direct cause.
The reader may still have a related worry. Since Barney was able to prevent
Fred from moving the stone, wasn't he able as well to prevent the contested
stone from moving simpliciter? After all, if Barney succeeds in preventing Fred
from moving the stone, it would seem he can succeed in preventing anything
from moving it. Surely, then, he can prevent the stone's moving?9
This worry derives from the erroneous supposition that having the ability to
prevent anything from moving the stone is sufficient for having the ability to
prevent the stone from moving. In a world in which uncaused events occur, the
stone may move even if nothing moves it. Hence, it doesn't follow from an
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agent's being able to prevent anything from moving the stone that it is able to
prevent the stone from moving.
Moreover, the assumption that Barney, in our scenario, is able to prevent the
stone from moving leads quickly to absurdity. Barney's prospective act of preventing the contested stone from moving is on all fours with Fred's prospective
act of causing that stone to move. And, ex hypothesi, Barney is no more powerful
than Fred. Hence, if we are entitled to suppose that Barney is able to execute
his intention to prevent the stone from moving, we are entitled as well to suppose
that Fred can execute his contrary intention. But omnipotent beings succeed in
doing whatever they intend to do, provided that their doing it is possible. Consequently, given the assumption under consideration, Barney prevents the stone
from moving while Fred causes it to move. And this, of course, is a logical
impossibility!
Barney is able to prevent Fred from moving the stone in our example. Indeed,
he does prevent Fred from moving it: if he had not interfered, Fred would have
moved the stone. However, this is quite compatible with Barney's being unable
to prevent the contested stone from moving, i.e., unable to cause it to remain
stationary. To keep the stone from moving he must do more than stalemate
Fred-he must defeat Fred.
Now, there are scenarios in which an uncaused resolution would render one
of our heroes victorious over the other. Suppose, e.g., that Fred knows that the
uncaused result of any possible simultaneous competition between him and
Barney over the stone would be the stone's moving and that he battles Barney
with the intention of setting the stage for this uncaused result. JO The stone's
moving constitutes a victory for Fred, even though he does not move it; for it
is the desired goal of an effective plan of action and is achieved in the way
represented in the plan. II
Is Barney's omnipotence impugned in this scenario? Not at all. Though it was
possible for Fred, in battling Barney, to bring about a condition under which
the stone would move, Barney could not similarly produce circumstances under
which the stone would remain unmoved; for the upshot of simultaneous competition could only be the stone's uncaused motion. Barney's best effort, given
Fred's resistance and the foreknown uncaused result of any simultaneous competition, could only help to generate the first-order stalemate condition under which
Fred would win a second-order victory. But Barney's plight is no worse than
that of the first player in a finite sequential contest between two omnipotent
beings. From the fact that a stone-maker cannot create a stone that an omnipotent
being cannot then lift, it does not follow that the former is not omnipotent.
There, victory is a function of the order of moves, not of relative power. In the
latest Fred/Barney scenario, similarly, victory is conferred by chance, and defeat
does not establish limited power.
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The Thomistic resolution of the original paradox of the stone allows for a
multiplicity of omnipotent beings. This should not be surprising, since the original
stone paradox is just a disguised contest between a pair of omnipotent beings.
The new paradox of the stone, in which the contest is made explicit and allowed
to be simultaneous rather than sequential, raises more serious problems. Even
here there is no logical contradiction, however. We see no logical difficulties
peculiar to a host of omnipotent beings, once the individual case is admitted.
This may suggest to some readers that the Thomistic resolution of the old
paradox of the stone is too good. As omnipotence is ordinarily conceived, an
omnipotent being's causal power is effective power-he executes his intentions
at will. However, the Thomistic line makes room for omnipotent beings whose
intentions to alter the world are never effective. Suppose that some possible
world is partially populated by a pair of omnipotent beings who are in constant
conflict over what might be called "supra-preventive" states of affairs. Neither
intends merely to prevent the other from executing its intentions; rather each
intends, in everything that it does, to accomplish something above and beyond
this, e.g., to destroy the stone that the other wishes to preserve. Suppose further
that neither can tell in advance what the result of simultaneous competition will
be. These beings will accomplish less than the ordinary human agent.
This problem is not peculiar to a Thomistic conception of omnipotence. Few
philosophers would require of an omnipotent being that it be able to do what is
logically impossible, even if they reject the Thomistic idea that the ability to
perform any logically possible action is a necessary condition of being omnipotent. 12 At the heart of the problem lies the very plausible assumption (VPA) that
an omnipotent being will actualize any possible state of affairs that it intends to
actualize, provided that its actualizing the state is possible. 13 However, in cases
of simultaneous competition of the sort just described between omnipotent beings,
neither can emerge victorious. The only possible resolution is a stalemate. But
if this is right, then given VPA, neither is able to do what it intends in these cases.
Does it follow that the competing omnipotent beings in our latest imaginary
world are in fact impotent? Not at all. They may each be possessed of boundless
power. Their problem lies in their aspirations. 14
Davidson College

NOTES
I. Summa Theologiae la. q. 25, art. 3. Cf. George Mavrodes, "Some Puzzles Concerning Omnipotence," Philosophical Review LXXII (1963): pp. 221-223.
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2. Cf. Duns Scotus, Ordinatio I, distinction 2, nn. 178-181; reprinted in L. Urban & D. Walton,
eds., The Power of Cod (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978), pp. 91f. Louis Werner rebuts
several variations of this argument in his "Some Omnipotent Beings," Critica 5 (1971): 55-69;
reprinted in Urban & Walton, pp. 94- 106.
3. If Barney is not essentially omnipotent, there are possible worlds in which he is not omnipotent.
In some such world there is a stone that Barney tries and fails to lift. However, we are concerned
in this paper only with possible worlds in which both of our main characters are omnipotent. One
way to restrict the discussion to this block of worlds would be to suppose that both characters are
essentially omnipotent. But one of us is skeptical about essential properties for individuals. Consequently, we simply stipulate that such assertions in this paper as "an omnipotent being cannot be
thwarted" are to be read as expressing only de dicta modalities.
It is worth noting that if a particular omnipotent being can render itself non-omnipotent, then,
other things being equal, there is nothing to exclude the possibility of its creating a stone that it
cannot lift. One way to accomplish the trick is as follows: first, the being irretrievably sheds enough
of its stone-lifting power that it is now too weak to lift stones weighing more than n pounds; then
it creates a stone weighing more than n pounds. Can we suppose, similarly, that if Fred is omnipotent,
he should be able to limit Barney's stone-lifting power and then create a stone too heavy for Barney
to lift? Suppose that Barney does not cooperate. Suppose, indeed, that Barney intends to retain all
of his power and to limit Fred's stone-creating capacity. What happens then? The central argument
of this paper applies to this contest as well.
4. This is not to deny that there are possible tasks that cannot be performed by omnipotent beingse.g., the task of lifting a stone such that, while one is lifting it, it is being lifted solely by a
non-omnipotent being. But in such cases no agent thwarts an omnipotent being's execution of the
possible task.
5. Cf. Mavrodes's final, unanswered query (p. 270) in his "Necessity, Possibility, and the Stone
which Cannot be Moved," Faith and Philosophy 2 (1985): 265-271.
6. Werner contends-mistakenly, as we shall show-that if two omnipotent beings will contradictory
states of affairs (e.g., that a particular stone continue to exist beyond f and that that stone cease to
exist at f), there is no possible resolution, and that it is therefore "logically impossible for there to
be two [omnipotent beings] with contradictory wills" ("Some Omnipotent Beings," p. 100 in Urban
& Walton).
7. We do not mean to take credit, of course, for the idea of dueling omnipotent beings. See the
references in note 2.
8. Strictly speaking, what is impossible are the following: (I) "keeping stationary a stone that an
omnipotent being wills to move"; and (2) "moving a stone that an omnipotent beings wills to hold
in place." In each case an omnipotent being "makes" a task impossible by making it true that the
prospective task fits one or the other of the descriptions.
9. A similar question can be raised about Fred's preventive ability, of course.
10. Though uncaused events are difficult, if not impossible, to predict, omnipotence is often linked
to omniscience and an omniscient being's knowledge of "future" events need not involve prediction.
11. Cf. Myles Brand, Intending and Acting (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1984), Ch. 1, Sec.7.
12. For objections to this idea, see, e.g., Richard Swinburne, The Coherence of Theism (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1977), pp. 150-152; Edward Wierenga, "Omnipotence Defined," Philosophy and
Phenomenological Research 42 (1983): 363-375; and Thomas Flint & Alfred Freddoso, "Maximal

290

Faith and Philosophy

Power," in A. Freddoso, ed., The Existence aruJ Nature of God (Notre Dame, IN: Notre Dame
University Press, 1983), pp. 81-113.
13. Notice how weak the assumption is. The claim is not that, if it intends to do so, an omnipotent
being will actualize any possible state of affairs that can be actualized, but only that, if it intends
to do so, it will actualize any possible state that it can actualize. Even so, the same cannot be said
of ordinary non-omnipotent beings. For example, even the best basketball players occasionally miss
freethrows that they are both able to make and intend to make. (Notice also that VPA states only a
necessary condition of omnipotence, and that it consequently is not challenged by the possible
existence of some clearly non-omnipotent being who, due in part to extreme limitations on what it
is possible for it to do, will actualize any possible state that it intends to actualize, provided that its
actualizing the state is possible.)
14. We wish to thank an anonymous referee for valuable criticism of the penultimate draft and for
useful references to the literature on omnipotence. Revisions were written during Mele's tenure of
a 1985/86 NEH Fellowship for College Teachers.

